“Joseph
Cheong Blows Up in Largest Pot in WSOP History”, announced PokerNews. “Incredibly
self-destructive,” opined Phil Hellmuth. Other blogs and news sites quickly followed
suit: “Cheong Loses Patience.” “Biggest Blow Up in WSOP History.”

By now, millions of poker fans know the details of this momentous hand from the final table
of the 2010 WSOP Main Event. Joseph Cheong’s bold, arguably reckless bluff for millions of
dollars in equity is destined to become an iconic hand for the “internet generation”.

Play was three-handed, with Joseph Cheong, sitting on 95M chips, slightly ahead of Jonathan
Duhamel’s 88M. Both significantly outchipped John Racener, who had 36M. Blinds were 600K/1.2M.
Racener folded his button, and Cheong opened to 2.9M from the SB. Duhamel three-bet to 6.75M
from his BB, Cheong four-bet to 14.25M, Duhamel five-bet to 22.75M, and Cheong put him all
in for over 88M. Duhamel quickly called.

When the hands were revealed, QQ for Duhamel and A7o Cheong, the audience was shocked. With
a much shorter stacked player still hanging on, the two chipleaders had just gotten into
a massive confrontation that would all but ensure one of them would be the next player eliminated.
The difference between 3rd and 2nd place was $1.4 million dollars.

Though some have questioned it, Duhamel’s decision to risk his tournament life with QQ seems
intuitive enough when we see that Cheong is indeed capable of making a move like this. It
was Cheong’s play with Ace-rag that really raised eyebrows. The conventional wisdom has been
that this was a “blow up”, a spiraling out of control of the disciplined aggression
that had kept Cheong in control of the final table for most of the day.

I am not so quick to agree. I can’t say for certain whether his play was correct, but I
can imagine circumstances that would justify it. Whether those circumstances existed I don’t
know, because I was not at the table that night, but neither were those rushing to condemn
his play. The critiques that I’ve read have generally failed to address the possible justifications
for this aggressive move. In short, I’ve concluded that while Cheong’s play certainly looks
reckless, we don’t have the information we’d need to judge him definitively.

In this article, I will discuss this hand in-depth and look at some of the factors that
each player should have been considering at each decision point. Of course, I cannot tell
you what they were actually thinking. My intent is only to elevate the level of discussion
surrounding a hand that is now a prominent part of poker history.

Racener Folds

Let’s start at the beginning. Racener is first to act, and he folds Q5o from the button.

As the short stack, Racener should base his strategy on how his opponents are playing. If
they are playing conservatively and trying to outlast him to lock up 2nd place money before
going to war with each other, then he should raise his button aggressively, perhaps even
with any two cards. Both of his opponents will be reluctant to risk doubling him up, and
he should be able to win a lot of small to medium pots through pure aggression. If this were
the case, he could easily justify a small raise with Q5o.

If his opponents seem willing to play big pots with each other, as in retrospect they clearly
were, then Racener should pass on marginal steals such as Q5o in order to give the big stacks
the opportunity to tangle. Stealing the blinds is worth something to him, but seeing one
of the chip leaders crippled or eliminated is worth far more.

Cheong Raises

Although A7o is clearly ahead of two random cards that Duhamel holds in the BB, raising
is not a given. Cheong’s hand selection for playing out of position against the other big
stack should depend on how Duhamel has been using his position.

If Duhamel has been staying out of Cheong’s way and trying to wait out Racener, then A7o
is an easy raise. Depending on how tight Duhamel is playing, Cheong could justify raising
with almost anything under these circumstances.

If Duhamel three-bets aggressively, causing many pots to end pre-flop with either a fold
or a four-bet, then A7o is a good hand to open. The Ace is a blocker to many of stronger
hands that Duhamel could hold, making a three-bet less likely and also a four-bet more profitable
should it come to that.

If Duhamel’s strategy has been to call Cheong’s raises and put pressure on him post-flop,
then A7o is not such a good choice. Although it figures to be ahead of Duhamel’s range for
calling a raise, it will play poorly post-flop. Much of its equity comes from situations
in which neither player makes anything and Ace-high is the best hand. Aggressive position
play from Duhamel would make it very difficult for Cheong to showdown A7o, and under such
circumstances, open folding it from the SB could actually be correct.

Duhamel Three-bets

With QQ, this is an easy three-bet. It would be quite difficult to construct a justification
for doing anything else. While Duhamel has some incentive to play conservatively against
the chip leader, re-raising with a hand this strong is the conservative play. Pre-flop, he
is virtually guaranteed to be ahead, and re-raising will usually enable him to lock up that
equity rather than risk tough decisions post-flop when it will be far more difficult to determine
where he stands. Importantly, QQ is also strong enough to stand up to a four-bet.

What other hands could Duhamel three-bet in this spot? Given that he has position on the
other big stack who is presumably raising a wide range of hands from the SB, three-betting
even a hand as weak as 72o could not be too bad. With Racener in a somewhat distant 3rd,
Cheong shouldn’t be looking to play a big pot out of position with just anything. Even though
he is not the chipleader, Duhamel can use his stack and his position to put pressure on his
opponent.

To some extent, it is a question of personal preference. While three-betting a hand like
J9s would surely be profitable, calling and taking advantage of his position post-flop would
also be profitable. Duhamel must determine how well he can outplay Cheong after the flop
with a given hand before deciding whether he’d rather three-bet with it.

The other important question is how often Cheong will four-bet vs. call when he doesn’t
fold. If he will mostly four-bet, then three-betting something like J9s is less advisable,
since Duhamel may cost himself the opportunity to take a flop in position. It would be better
to three-bet a hand like K5o that has less potential to make a strong hand post-flop. If
Cheong will mostly call, then three-betting J9s makes more sense, as even if Cheong doesn’t
fold immediately, Duhamel will still get to see the flop. 

Cheong Four-bets

Folding or four-betting are Cheong’s only options with A7o. Unless Duhamel plays very poorly
post-flop, calling out of position is not going to show a profit. The question of whether
to four-bet depends on how Cheong perceives his opponent’s 3- and five-betting ranges. This
is a good spot for Duhamel to put pressure on Cheong with a three-bet in position, so his
range may well be wide.

That in itself is not sufficient reason to four-bet light, though. Cheong must also believe
that Duhamel will not five-bet aggressively if four-bet. Given the presence of Racener as
the short stack, Duhamel has a lot of incentive to avoid putting his whole stack at risk.
Thus, he could well have a narrow five-betting range.

Given that he has little interest in seeing a flop with this hand (as opposed to something
like JTs which could potentially flop well) Cheong ought to choose a four-bet size that forces
Duhamel to either move all-in or fold. Although the opportunity to make the last bet can
be valuable, as it precludes the possibility of a rebluff, in this case there is good reason
to think that Duhamel will not move in particularly light.

Cheong’s four-bet offers his opponent 3:1 odds to take a flop in position against what could
still be a relatively wide range. I would therefore say that his sizing does not put sufficient
pressure on Duhamel to make a decision for his stack. Cheong’s four-bet only makes sense
if it can force a fold from many of Duhamel’s lighter three-betting hands, and given the
size of the four-bet, I doubt that it can.

Such a small four-bet also leaves open the possibility of a light five-bet, as Duhamel would
have room to fold even after putting in another raise. From a game theoretical perspective,
it is undesirable to give your opponent additional strategic options. If Cheong believes
that Duhamel will five-bet in an exploitable way, however, then giving him room to do so
could be correct. Otherwise, I would prefer a four-bet in the neighborhood of 18M, a size
that would virtually force Duhamel to either move all in or fold.

Duhamel Five-bets

Assuming that Duhamel believes his QQ is still well ahead of Cheong’s range, which seems
reasonable, then he should five-bet. Although he’d prefer not to get all in against the player
who could eliminate him in 3rd, that may be unavoidable at this point. If he calls, there
will be fewer than three pot-sized bets remaining in the effective stacks. Folding will be
out of the question if he flops an overpair, and if an A or K flops, he will be faced with
the unpleasant prospect of either getting his money in drawing to 2 outs a substantial amount
of the time or folding the best hand a substantial amount of the time.

Given that Duhamel has position and a very strong hand, he can theoretically get away with
making a much smaller raise than can Cheong. But should he? Or should he take the conservative
route and move all-in? Presumably Cheong will never fold AA, KK, or AK, and Duhamel will
not fold his QQ to a six-bet, so the question is whether he ought to give Cheong room to
six-bet hands that would not be able to call if Duhamel simply moved all-in now.

This depends on heavily on what kinds of hands Cheong will six-bet. In theory, Cheong ought
to six-bet only hands that will perform best against Duhamel’s presumably tight calling range.
This means that even his light six-bets ought to come primarily from Ax hands, which both
contain a blocker to parts of Duhamel’s calling range and have the best chance of drawing
out against QQ or KK.

If Cheong’s light six-betting range is primarily Ax or KQ hands that contain an overcard
to his Queens, then Duhamel may actually prefer not to induce a bluff from those hands. When
Cheong holds such a hand, then Duhamel must choose between a 100% chance of winning 29M and
walking away from the hand with 103M or a 72% chance of winning 177M with a 28% chance of
elimination in 3rd.

Giving Cheong room to six-bet light with these hands is worth about 30M in EV, so this isn’t
a trivial edge to pass up. It hinges on how likely Racener will be to go out in 3rd if Duhamel
takes the pot down now and on whether Duhamel feels he will have an edge during heads up
play.

Commentary on this hand has generally treated it as a given that Cheong and Duhamel could
simply fold into 2nd place if they avoided a confrontation, but Racener’s stack of 36M is
not trivial. Even if Duhamel takes the pot down now, he will have less than three times Racener’s
chips. Were Racener to double through him, Duhamel would be the new short stack.

Moreover, Cheong seems like he would be no pushover in a heads up match. I believe Duhamel
was correct to risk elimination for the opportunity to cripple his chief competitor and pick
up a ton of chips in the process.

His play becomes even more correct if Cheong makes the mistake of six-betting even weaker
hands like 76s. While QQ is only a 72% favorite against a hand like A7 that has one overcard,
it is a 78% favorite against 76s and an 85% favorite against T7o if Cheong really gets nutty.

Cheong Six-bets

By the time Duhamel puts the 5th bet into the pot, should it be obvious to Cheong that he
has a big hand? Not if Duhamel is a very good player. By definition, a good player’s hand
is never face up when there is still money to bet. After all, if Cheong can put in six bets
without a monster, why can’t Duhamel put in five?

We have already discussed why Duhamel can have a wide three-betting range and Cheong a relatively
wide four-betting range. If Cheong folds all but his biggest hands to the five-bet, then
Duhamel could show a big profit by five-betting small with all of his hands that are too
weak to call the four-bet.

What is true is that Duhamel’s five-betting range ought to be polarized. That is, it should
not contain hands such as 88 or AJ that are strong but not quite strong enough to call a
six-bet. Presumably Duhamel will either call the four-bet or move all in with these hands
rather than risk getting blown off of them by making a small six-bet. Thus, his range for
a small five-bet ought to consist of those very few hands strong enough to call a six-bet
and also some number of bluffs with hands too weak to call the four-bet.

The wisdom of six-betting with A7 is 100% dependent on how often Duhamel five-bets light.
This is an important point that most of the chatter surrounding has missed. Cheong’s six-bet
should not really be putting additional pressure on his opponent. This is because there should
not be any middle-of-the-road hands in Duhamel’s five-betting range. Either he is five-betting
with a very strong hand to induce a bluff and definitely calling a shove, or he is five-betting
light and definitely folding to a shove. A good player will avoid putting himself in an awkward
spot by five-betting small with something marginal like 88.

The pressure inherent in a confrontation between two big stacks at the final table is reflected
in the very small number of hands strong enough to five-bet and call a six-bet. Even hands
as strong as TT may prefer to move all-in rather than risk getting six-bet by AJ or KQ.

Thus, Cheong ought to be able to conclude that Duhamel’s value range is extremely narrow.
Although the desire to avoid getting crippled with Racener still in the game ought to sway
him away from pushing a very small edge, moving in with A7 is justifiable if Duhamel has
enough bluffs in his range that will. Again, the purpose of this six-bet would not be to
bluff Duhamel off of a better hand but rather to take down all of the money in the pot on
the assumption that Duhamel has a lot of bluffs in his five-betting range.

Does he? All I can say is that he might. The incentive is there. Cheong had established
himself as an aggressive four-bettor, and Duhamel may have been looking for an opportunity
to put him in his place. This sure looks like one. Duhamel has position, both players’ ranges
are as wide as they will ever be, and Cheong ought to be somewhat constrained by Racener’s
presence at the table.

Unless he expects Cheong to bluff far more than is optimal, Duhamel’s bluff percent should
not be zero. I do not believe that any commentator is in a better position than Cheong himself
to estimate how often Duhamel will fold to that six-bet.

Conclusion

This year’s November Nine exemplify the new face of poker. Eight of them were under the
age of thirty, and seven were primarily online professionals. The final table was characterized
by the controlled but relentless pre-flop aggression for which the “internet generation” is
known. Commenting on a live webcast of the final table, two “old-school” professionals,
Adam Schoenfeld and Phil Hellmuth, remarked how ten years ago the fifth bet would always
mean Aces. Now we see a six-bet with A7 in the largest, and one of the most-watched, pots
in WSOP history.

Like it or not, this style of play has shaken the live poker circuit to its core. Head-shaking
and tongue-clucking is not going to make it go away. Better then to understand it, if not
to use it then at least to combat it.

Joseph Cheong is an experienced, successful tournament player who understands how to use
aggression. Of course, even great players make mistakes, but I would argue that he is better
equipped to interpret this dynamic than are any of those seeking to comment on this hand,
myself included. Rather than rushing to pass judgment on his play, we would all do well to
try to learn from it. Mistake or not, it was an extremely complex hand worthy of the final
table of the WSOP Main Event.